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Keywords

Lone actor terrorism; attack planning; attack preparation; motivation; capability; chronological overview; geospatial characteristics; temporal characteristics

Acronyms

Acronyms	Definitions
DoW	Description of Work
LAAPP	Lone Actor Attack Planning & Preparation
PSC	PRIME Steering Committee
RAF	Risk Analysis Framework
RAPA	Radicalisation, Attack Preparation, Attack
SME	Subject Matter Expert
UoL	University of Leiden

1. Introduction

1.1 Context

years prior to a lone actor attack, and by combining this information with a robust theoretical framework and an appropriate analytical approach (scripting), the PRIME project aims to yield more sophisticated models and theories of involvement in terrorist violence.

As set out in Deliverables D3.1 and D3.2, the PRIME project is organised around a Risk Analysis Framework (RAF) that divides the pre-attack process into three phases; 'radicalisation', 'attack preparation' and the 'attack' itself. Collecting data relevant to each of these phases has been allocated to different partners within the PRIME consortium, with the ultimate aim of combining their work into one integrated script of a lone actor extremist event. Within this broader effort, the UoL team is responsible for the development of the attack planning and preparation subscript, and associated analytical products.

1.3 Deliverable objectives

The subsequent sections outline the methodological approach taken by the UoL team, provide a summary of activities and research findings to date, and conclude by looking ahead to future steps. In particular, the following topics are addressed:

> The methodological considerations upon which the description of the LAAPP phase is based;

> A description of the case selection process;

> A look at the types of data collected so far and outstanding data needs;

> A summary description of the work conducted up to this point in time and future steps.

In keeping with the DoW, this data inventory will refer where applicable to the four levels of analysis identified in D3.1. As Figure 1 illustrates, while each of these levels of analysis represent dimensions relevant to the pre-attack process, their relative importance is likely to vary depending on the phase of the process being studied. The attack preparation and planning phase is most strongly associated with the individual and situational levels of analysis. It focuses primarily on how and why individuals acquire and maintain their intent and motivation to commit an attack, procure the necessary material means (capability), and form the plan required to match motivation with capability and permit an actual attack to materialise.

Figure 1 Risk Analysis Matrix[1]

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Phase of Event</th></tr>
<tr><th>Radicalisation</th><th>Attack Preparation</th><th>Attack</th></tr>
<tr><th rowspan="2">Level of Analysis</th><td>Individual</td><td>Susceptibility to moral change

Susceptibility to social selection

Susceptibility to self-selection</td><td>Social, physical and cognitive resources

Susceptibility to social and self-selection</td><td>Social, physical and cognitive resources</td></tr>
<tr><td>Situational</td><td>Exposure to radicalising settings

Radicalising agents

Radicalising teachings

Social monitoring context</td><td>Opportunity structure

Moral context

Perception of action alternative

Perception of capability (risk)

Emergence of motivation</td><td>Opportunity structure

Moral context

Perception of action alternative

Perception of</td></tr>
</table>

2. Conceptual and Methodological Approach

2.1 Rationale

and experience, for instance through attending firearms courses or traveling abroad to participate in paramilitary training, could be important observable indicators of capability acquisition and thus potential intervention points.

Another important but perhaps not directly apparent aspect of capability is overcoming internal moral barriers to the use of violence. For most individuals, harming or killing others is difficult to do unless a form of 'moral disengagement' has occurred that allows them to lower or bypass internal psychological constraints prohibiting such behaviour. There are various processes that can contribute to moral disengagement, such as dehumanizing opponents or attributing ultimate responsibility for violent actions to leaders or ideological mandates for violence (Bandura, 1990). Where possible, the UoL team sought to map such processes as well.

The acquisition of the material and cognitive capability to commit acts of violence also draws attention to the role of external assistance. While lone actors are generally characterised by high degrees of autonomy and independence, they are seldom completely socially isolated (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). Contacts with other people, whether in 'real life' or the online domain, can be crucial to the emergence and maintenance of both motivation and capability. Lone actors frequently seek some form of legitimisation for violence from people they see as authority figures and might approach others to gain their (unwitting) help with the acquisition of the means or skills necessary to carry out an attack (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). When studying how and when the motivation and capability to conduct an attack were acquired and maintained, the social dimension cannot be overlooked.

In our understanding (see Deliverable 3.1 "Risk Analysis Framework"), motivation and

and colleagues (Gill et al., 2014). The task of carrying out data collection for the Large-N was allocated to the UCL team. That work involved updating the existing database of lone actors assembled by Gill and colleagues, which, at the time the PRIME project began, contained 119 lone actors who engaged in or planned to engage in terrorism in the United States and Europe, and were convicted for, or died in, the commission of their offence between 1990 and 2011 (Gill et al., 2014).

The original database contained both individuals who committed their offence autonomously, with or without links to an organisation, and isolated dyads, which are pairs of individuals operating independently of a group. That original dataset contained 185 variables. Independent coders collectively spent 5500 hours working on data collection and coding. To qualify for inclusion, each observation had to be recorded by three independent coders, then results reconciled in two stages (coder A with coder B, then coders AB with C). Most of the material was sourced using LexisNexis (e.g. media reports, scholarly articles, published biographies), and therefore qualifies as open source.

At the start of the PRIME project, all new LAEs that emerged in 2012, 2013 and 2014 were added to the database, while, to conform with the definitional requirements of PRIME (see D3.1), dyads were removed from the original database (n=19). Likewise, cases were removed from the original dataset if 1) the individual was part of a cell; 2) they were arrested for non-attack related behaviours (e.g. dissemination of publications); 3) they were involved in attacks with no ideological motivation; 4) their arrest involved an FBI sting operation; and 5) the individual was not convicted. This led to the removal of a further 24 cases from the original Gill et al dataset. Taking updates up to 2014 into account, this produced a dataset of 111 cases which fit the PRIME definition requirements. The countries represented in the large-N dataset are the US, UK, Australia, Norway, The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, France, and Germany.

Additionally, cases from 2000 onwards were re-examined for new information that might have come to light in open sources since the initial dataset was built. Furthermore, non-UK European cases, where the lack of language expertise in the original data collection may have hindered the original coding effort, were recoded. This particular effort is ongoing.

Two additional, significant data collection endeavours are still in progress at the time of writing this deliverable. The first involves coding all lone actors active in 2015 (and some leftover cases from 2014). It is anticipated that this will add around 20 new cases to the dataset (a definite number cannot be stated until each actor has been evaluated to make sure they fit the project's definitional requirements).

The second data collection effort involves coding all existing cases in the dataset with a new set of questions produced to suit PRIME's data needs. This increases the number

PRIME

2.4 Data collection

In order to capture information relevant to understanding lone actor attack planning and preparation, the available data needed to be interrogated in specific ways. Following consultations with the PRIME team during the London (2014) and Jerusalem (2015) PSC meetings, a two-pronged approach to data collection was taken. First, data on the cases was entered into a specially-designed Excel spreadsheet to visualise the chronological progression of LAAPP through its various stages and to capture qualitative information on this process. Second, the information thus formatted was analysed using new codebook questions, which were eventually added to the original Gill et al. codebook to strengthen analysis of LAAPP phase in the Large-N dataset. This allowed quantitative elements to be captured, such as the duration of various preparatory processes and whether or not individuals were part of broader social

findings do provide starting points for thinking about detection and prevention (Appleton, 2014). Some of the capability-related findings also have this potential, as activities such as the stockpiling of weapons, the execution of attack rehearsals ('dry runs') and increased physical training are all essentially observable behaviours. This codebook category was developed specifically to record such instances where lone actor terrorists (inadvertently) 'leaked' indicators of their motivation or capability to commit an attack, which can function as detectable early warning signs.

2.4.6 Concealment & operational security

Maintaining a low profile and safeguarding the secrecy of terrorism-related activities ('operational security') is essential for those who intend to use this form of political violence, whether they are operating in groups or acting alone. Learning more about lone actors' degree of security consciousness is interesting in its own right. However, previous research has also suggested that the relative amateurism of many (would-be) terrorists means their attempts to maintain secrecy may, as a matter of fact, draw more rather than less attention to their activities. Increasingly paranoid behaviour, possession of multiple mobile phones, the use of veiled language and code words, last-minute changes to meeting places: while intended to safeguard secrecy, such behaviour may actually be important indicators that something is afoot (Schuurman & Eijkman, 2015; Schuurman, Harris-Hogan, Zammit, & Lentini, 2014).

2.4.7 Post-preparation phase

Work by Smith et al. (2008) and Smith et al. (2006) indicated that the completion of planning and preparatory phases may be marked by a sudden drop in activity, a period of 'doing nothing' that could presage the execution of the actual attack. The UoL team is interested in assessing whether their cases are similarly marked by a post-preparation phase. If its existence can be confirmed, such a sudden and marked drop in activity on the part of the (would-be) lone actor terrorists would form a very useful intervention point.

2.4.9 Related activities

Terrorists do more than work on planning and preparing their (next) attack. While LAAPP can be a time-intensive process, these individuals usually engage in numerous activities that have little or no direct bearing on their violent intentions or plans. Yet

Table 3 Visualizing lone actor attack preparation (simplified)

Lone actor [Name] timeline								
	Undated	Previous	T-5	T-4	T-3	T-2	T-1	Event
Personal background								
Social Context								
Attack planning								
Attack preparation								
Concealment / OpSec								
Leakage behaviour								
Post-prep activities								
Geospatial data								
Related activities								

2.6 Data needs assessment

As outlined in D3.2, the PRIME project relies on various types of data to chart lone actors' progression from radicalisation through to attack execution. The medium-N analysis is primarily dependent on open-source information, such as media reports, academic and journalistic literature (including biographies of lone actor extremists) and publicly available courtroom verdicts. For the in-depth case studies, this data is supplemented with as much primary-sources based information as can be acquired. In particular, the UoL team gained access to SMEs such as the public prosecutors involved in the investigations, autobiographical materials produced by the lone actors themselves, information contained in police files and Dutch court cases involving lone actor extremists.

Terrorism studies has long suffered from a lack of primary-sources based research and the scarcity of such material continues to be a problem (Sageman, 2014). For good reasons: finding, accessing and convincing (former) terrorists or extremists to participate in interviews or focus groups, gaining access to government data, let alone carrying out any kind of experimental or clinical study, is very time consuming and failure remains a likely outcome (Orsini, 2013; Toros, 2008). Given the scarcity of high-quality primary-source-based data in research on lone actor terrorism, the information used in the small-N analysis makes a significant contribution to the state of knowledge.

Although primary sources are generally more accurate and reliable than secondary ones, this does not mean the latter are of limited utility in studying lone actors' planning and preparation processes. The UoL team has been able to ascertain that the

available open-sources based secondary data (media reports, judicial verdicts) is generally sufficiently detailed to allow the reconstruction of the attack planning and

stakeholders involved in the investigations. The utilization of these materials followed the submission of an official request for access to the Dutch Attorney General's office. For reasons of security and privacy protection, none of the materials contained in the police files can be made publicly available.

With regard to the 40 medium-N cases, the UoL team is currently finalising data collection. From late 2015 onward, several student assistants have been engaged to speed up data collection efforts. This is partly why the UoL team was able to expand the medium-N sample to 40 cases instead of the 20 originally planned for. Input from the PRIME Expert Advisory Board indicated the additional LAAPP cases were of special interest to practitioners and validated this additional effort.

3.2 Preliminary findings

With data collection and analysis ongoing, no definitive findings can be reported at this stage. That being said, a number of preliminary conclusions can be identified.

First of all, it is encouraging that the research method outlined in the previous pages has proven feasible. The data that the UoL team has gathered allows the LAAPP process to be disentangled into the various phases relevant to understanding the development of motivation and capability to commit an attack as conceptualised in the project's RAF. Furthermore, collecting this information in the specially-made Excel spreadsheet described in Table 2 does indeed offer insights into how these various processes develop over time and how they relate to one another. With data collection virtually completed, the past months have also seen the RAPA teams begin to integrate their findings, assessing how the three subscripts can be connected.

Secondly, it is striking that in many of the cases studied so far, the lone actor extremists were not as alone as their name implies. Some actively tried but (largely) failed to recruit others to join their cause, implying that their status as 'lone' actors was not volitional. In other cases, the individuals studied had various kinds of social connections relevant to the attacks being planned, such as with persons who provided information on bomb-making, assisted with target selection or legitimised and even encouraged the use of violence. Most were (loosely) connected to social networks that shared their radical or extremist views, even if these larger groups did not actively engage in violence themselves.

Although most of the lone actors in question did end up carrying out the (intended)

Finalising data collection and completing data analysis will be the primary task of the UoL team in the PRIME project's final year. By the time of the next PSC meeting in June 2016 in Aarhus, the UoL team aims to be able to present its preliminary subscript of the LAAPP phase and discuss how this can inform the Bayesian Large-N analysis.

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PRIME: Attack Planning and Preparation Codebook[1]

! All relevant locations are to be recorded !

3   [ ] Yes, criminal
88 [ ] Unk1[hwn

2   [ ] They did not cease
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

2. Did the individual have contacts with radicals, extremists or terrorists?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these contacts start?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these contacts cease?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    2   [ ] They did not cease
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

3. Did the individual have contacts with radical, extremist or terrorist <u>leaders/authority figures</u>?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, what were their names?
    1   [ ] *Describe*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these contacts start?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these contacts cease?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    2   [ ] They did not cease
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

4. Did the individual <u>swear fealty to</u>, or in any other way <u>become recognizably involved</u> with, a (foreign) radical, extremist or terrorist group, organization or network?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, what was the individual or group's name?

1   [ ] *Describe*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did this occur?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

5. Did the individual *unsuccessfully* try to join or create an extremist or terrorist group?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes, join an existing group
    3   [ ] Yes, create a new group
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, what group?
    1   [ ] *Describe*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this attempt occur?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

6. Did the individual receive (implicit) justification or encouragement for the use of violence?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, from who?
    1   [ ] *Describe*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this occur?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

7. Was the individual ordered by a (foreign) extremist or terrorist leader to carry out an attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, by who or what organizations?
    1   [ ] *Describe*

88 [ ] Unknown

1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

ATTACK PLANNING

1. Did the individual develop a clear intention to commit an attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

2. Was the (intended) attack the result of planning or a spontaneous decision?
    1   [ ] Planning
    2   [ ] Spontaneous
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If planned, how long before the attack did planning <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If planned, how long before the attack did planning <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    2   [ ] Did not end; e.g. planning resumed after each attack (Copeland case)
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

3. Can a 'trigger' event or moment be identified that led the individual to initiate actual attack planning?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, please describe it:
    1   [ ] *Description*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how much time elapsed between the trigger and the start of planning activities?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

4. Was an attack carried out?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   3 [ ] Yes, but failed
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, did the actual and the planned target correspond?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

5. Did the individual go through multiple potential targets that differed from the final selection of one or more?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

6. Did the individual collect information on possible targets using the internet?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did this <u>first</u> occur?
   1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did this <u>last</u> occur?
   1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

7. Did the individual conduct target reconnaissance in person?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how many times did this occur?
   1 [ ] *X times*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did this <u>first</u> occur?
   1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown

99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did this <u>last</u> occur?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

8. Did the individual formulate a concrete plan/guide to assist with attack preparation and execution?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event was this plan finalized?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

9. Did certain constraints influence target selection or attack planning processes?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, please describe how:
    1   [ ] *Description*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

ATTACK PREPARATION

1. Did the individual conduct preparations for an attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did preparations <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did preparations <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

2. Can a 'trigger' event or moment be identified that led the individual to initiate actual attack preparation?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes

88 [ ] Unknown

If yes, please describe it:
1   [ ] *Description*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how much time elapsed between the trigger and the start of preparatory activities?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

3. Did the individual acquire (a) (remote) location(s) specifically to conduct preparations?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

4. Did the individual watch execution video's (as desensitization to violence)?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the attack did this begin/take place?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

5. Did the individual compose a last will, martyrs statement etc.?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event was it made?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

6. Did the individual undertake firearms training?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did firearms training <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*

88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did firearms training <u>end</u>?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

7. Did the individual practice shooting by him/herself?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did shooting practice <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did shooting practice <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

8. Did the individual participate in paramilitary training with non-state actors (e.g. overseas terrorist training camp)?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did training <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did training <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, was this training undertaken <u>specifically</u> to prepare for the event?
    1   [ ] Purposeful
    2   [ ] Opportunistic
    3   [ ] Criminal
    4   [ ] Other
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

9. Did the individual acquire funds specifically for the (planned) attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes, legally

3   [ ] Yes, illegally
4   [ ] Legally and illegally
88 [ ] Unknown

If yes, please describe how:
1   [ ] *Description*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did funds acquisition <u>start</u>?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did funds acquisition <u>end</u>?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

10. Did the individual (attempt to) acquire ammunition?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

11. Did the individual (attempt to) acquire firearms?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, was weapons acquisition purposeful, opportunistic or related to other purposes (e.g. sport shooting, hunting, personal protection etc.)?
1   [ ] Purposeful
2   [ ] Opportunistic
3   [ ] Criminal
4   [ ] Other
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

12. Did the individual (attempt to) acquire other types of (hand-held) weapons?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, what type of weapon(s)?
    1   [ ] *Description*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>begin</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>end</u>?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, was weapons acquisition purposeful, opportunistic or related to other purposes (e.g. sport shooting, hunting, personal protection etc.)?
    1   [ ] Purposeful
    2   [ ] Opportunistic
    3   [ ] Criminal
    4   [ ] Other
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

13. Did the individual (attempt to) acquire/purchase a <u>ready-made</u> explosive device?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the even

88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, was acquisition of the ready-made explosive purposeful or opportunistic?
1   [ ] Purposeful
2   [ ] Opportunistic
3   [ ] Criminal
4   [ ] Other
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

14. Did the individual (attempt to) acquire the chemicals necessary for an explosive substance?
1   [ ] No
2   [ ] Yes
88 [ ] Unknown

If yes, how long before the event did these attempts begin?
1   [ ] X Years/months/weeks/days
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did these attempts end?
1   [ ] X Years/months/weeks/days
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, was chemicals acquisition purposeful or opportunistic?
1   [ ] Purposeful
2   [ ] Opportunistic
3   [ ] Criminal
4   [ ] Other
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

15. Did the individual (attempt to) acquire the (laboratory) equipment necessary to construct an explosive device?
1   [ ] No
2   [ ] Yes
88 [ ] Unknown

If yes, how long before the event did these attempts begin?
1   [ ] X Years/months/weeks/days
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did these attempts end?
1   [ ] X Years/months/weeks/days
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, was laboratory acquisition purposeful or opportunistic?
1   [ ] Purposeful
2   [ ] Opportunistic
3   [ ] Criminal
4   [ ] Other
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

16. Did the individual (attempt to) construct an explosive device?
   1   [ ] No
   2   [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown

   If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>begin</u>?
   1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>end</u>?
   1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, was construction of the explosive purposeful or opportunistic?
   1   [ ] Purposeful
   2   [ ] Opportunistic
   3   [ ] Criminal
   4   [ ] Other
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

17. Did the individual (attempt to) obtain or construct an incendiary device?
   1   [ ] No
   2   [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, what kind of incendiary device?
   1   [ ] *Describe*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>begin</u>?
   1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did these attempts <u>end</u>?
   1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*

88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

3. Did the individual suddenly begin to display surreptitious or paranoid behavior?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, what kind of behavior?
    1   [ ] *Description*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

4. Did the individual use multiple mobile phones or SIM cards?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

5. Did the individual use veiled language in communications with fellow extremists or co-conspirators?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

6. Did the individual take measures to safeguard the secrecy of his/her intentions/preparations?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply?

    If yes, what kind of measures?
    1   [ ] *Describe*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

7. Did the individual use data protection measures?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
   1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

8. Did the individual attempt to identify or dissuade potential informants?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown

   If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
   1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

9. Did the individual make last minute changes to meeting locations?
   1 [ ] No
   2 [ ] Yes
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

   If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
   1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
   88 [ ] Unknown
   99 [ ] Does not apply

10. Did the individual hide weapons, explosives or other incriminating evidence?
    1 [ ] No
    2 [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did this begin?
    1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

11. Did the individual attempt to find out if he/she was under surveillance/had attracted the authorities' attention?
    1 [ ] No
    2 [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how long before the event did this begin?

1 [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

EARLY WARNING / LEAKAGE BEHAVIOR

1. Did the individual (inadvertently) communicate to others involvement in suspicious activities?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how did the individual communicate his/her involvement?
    1   [ ] *Describe*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this <u>first</u> occur?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this <u>last</u> occur?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

2. Did the individual (inadvertently) communicate his radical or extremist convictions to others?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

    If yes, how did the individual communicate his/her extremist convictions?
    1   [ ] *Describe*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this <u>first</u> occur?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

    If yes, how long before the event did this <u>last</u> occur?
    1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

3. Did the individual express a desire to commit an unspecified attack, online or in person?
    1   [ ] No

2   [ ] Yes, online
3   [ ] Yes, in person
88 [ ] Unknown

If yes, how long before the

88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did this <u>first</u> occur?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long before the event did this <u>last</u> occur?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

7. Did the individual plan or intend to escape after completing the attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

8. Did the individual plan or intend to die during the attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

9. Did the individual come into contact with or was he/she known by the authorities while conducting planning or preparation activities?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown

If yes, how long before the event did this occur?
1   [ ] *X Years/months/weeks/days*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, was the individual at that time suspected of involvement in extremism or terrorism?
1   [ ] No
2   [ ] Yes
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

POST-PREPARATION PHASE

1. Did the individual display a conspicuous drop in attack-related activities between completing planning & preparatory activities and executing the attack?
    1   [ ] No
    2   [ ] Yes
    88 [ ] Unknown
    99 [ ] Does not apply

If yes, how long did this 'phase of little activity' last, measured in months:
1   [ ] *Describe*
88 [ ] Unknown
99 [ ] Does not apply

7.